Lithuanian Airlines has ceased its operations. I sincerely hope that this will allow airBaltic to get one step closer to the inevitable (and in my opinion desirable) goal to become a regional airline that is at home in all three Baltic States. Honestly, I had been waiting for this moment - even though, of course, I at the same time feel sorry for the employees who lose their jobs in the course of these events.
And I read flyLAL's last press release, where one line blames "unfair market conditions" (among other factors, of course) for the airline's death. Unfair? From all I know, I'd say you were outperformed, guys.
The press release, which can be seen under www.flylal.com, also mentions the still pending "unfair competition" lawsuit against airBaltic.
More quotes? Here you go (exact words and grammar): "Being the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania we are sure that only national carrier can secure the interests of the state itself. Therefore flyLAL (...) is open for further proposals, which can secure further direct flights from Vilnius to various destinations." (Vytautas Kaikaris, CEO).
In what way exactly can 'only a national carrier' secure the interests of the state? What are state interests in that case in the first place? Aren't we rather talking about citizen's interest in direct flights from an airport in their proximity? That's not primarily a state interest, but a people's interest. In what way could 'only a national carrier' secure these interests? And isn't it so that a few months back, airBaltic had about as many direct flights operating from Vilnius as flyLAL (if not more!), not to mention a lot of excellent connection flights via Riga? That was when airBaltic allegedly performed what flyLAL calls "unfair competition", and what I call "smart business strategy versus a local airline that has simply failed to understand that times DO change".
Mister Kaikaris still believes in the state to heal all wounds? Believes that an airline's purpose to exist is to secure interests of a state? That an airline has to be state-owned or 'national' in order to serve the interests of the people (or the government, for whatever that should mean)?
It's 2009, for god's sake.
And the game is called business.
So, quo vadis, airBaltic (unfortunately also still 52.6% state-owned)?
Well, the management buy-out of the SAS stake (47.2% they say; wonder where the 0.2 remaining percent are) seems to be coming in the nearest days, which I think is a step forward (I would have preferred a scenario in which the Latvian State would have sold its stake to SAS, and then Lufthansa buying SAS, but I admit that's a bit much to wish for). Maybe the Latvian State will finally sell its stake nevertheless - I think this would be another step forward. Lufthansa, where's your offer? Come on, you got the cash!
And I read flyLAL's last press release, where one line blames "unfair market conditions" (among other factors, of course) for the airline's death. Unfair? From all I know, I'd say you were outperformed, guys.
The press release, which can be seen under www.flylal.com, also mentions the still pending "unfair competition" lawsuit against airBaltic.
More quotes? Here you go (exact words and grammar): "Being the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania we are sure that only national carrier can secure the interests of the state itself. Therefore flyLAL (...) is open for further proposals, which can secure further direct flights from Vilnius to various destinations." (Vytautas Kaikaris, CEO).
In what way exactly can 'only a national carrier' secure the interests of the state? What are state interests in that case in the first place? Aren't we rather talking about citizen's interest in direct flights from an airport in their proximity? That's not primarily a state interest, but a people's interest. In what way could 'only a national carrier' secure these interests? And isn't it so that a few months back, airBaltic had about as many direct flights operating from Vilnius as flyLAL (if not more!), not to mention a lot of excellent connection flights via Riga? That was when airBaltic allegedly performed what flyLAL calls "unfair competition", and what I call "smart business strategy versus a local airline that has simply failed to understand that times DO change".
Mister Kaikaris still believes in the state to heal all wounds? Believes that an airline's purpose to exist is to secure interests of a state? That an airline has to be state-owned or 'national' in order to serve the interests of the people (or the government, for whatever that should mean)?
It's 2009, for god's sake.
And the game is called business.
So, quo vadis, airBaltic (unfortunately also still 52.6% state-owned)?
Well, the management buy-out of the SAS stake (47.2% they say; wonder where the 0.2 remaining percent are) seems to be coming in the nearest days, which I think is a step forward (I would have preferred a scenario in which the Latvian State would have sold its stake to SAS, and then Lufthansa buying SAS, but I admit that's a bit much to wish for). Maybe the Latvian State will finally sell its stake nevertheless - I think this would be another step forward. Lufthansa, where's your offer? Come on, you got the cash!
My very personal awards for the dumbest, most annoying, or simply silly stuff of 2008. Spotlights on, fanfare, and applause for the winners:
And that's the way www.bbc.co.uk looks if you attempt to access it from Uzbekistan.
Not the only page that looks like this. However, access blocks appear to be limited to English- and Russian-language news sources.
Not the only page that looks like this. However, access blocks appear to be limited to English- and Russian-language news sources.
Original post from Saturday 22.11.; updated Monday morning. Original post starts below the text in Italics.
Found quite many interesting links during my morning blog reading exercise, first and foremost to Juris Kaza's and Aleks Tapinsh's blogs, who obviously both had discovered the issue before me and seem better informed (well - they know Latvian, and they are journalists). Anyway both very interesting blogs, recommended.
http://allaboutlatvia.com/article/731/d-word-can-cost-yo/
http://allaboutlatvia.com/article/733/devaluation-pronouncements/
http://freespeechlatvia.blogspot.com/
Quite a law they have made. Would suit Soviet jurisdiction just fine.
Der Standard, an Austrian newspaper - good if people outside take notice of such events. Europe-wide embarrassment often works wonders...
There's crazy stuff happening in the politics of every country. But when crazy stuff is being distributed worldwide, Latvia again and again manages to secure its claim for an extra portion...:
Found quite many interesting links during my morning blog reading exercise, first and foremost to Juris Kaza's and Aleks Tapinsh's blogs, who obviously both had discovered the issue before me and seem better informed (well - they know Latvian, and they are journalists). Anyway both very interesting blogs, recommended.
http://allaboutlatvia.com/article/731/d-word-can-cost-yo/
http://allaboutlatvia.com/article/733/devaluation-pronouncements/
http://freespeechlatvia.blogspot.com/
Quite a law they have made. Would suit Soviet jurisdiction just fine.
Der Standard, an Austrian newspaper - good if people outside take notice of such events. Europe-wide embarrassment often works wonders...
There's crazy stuff happening in the politics of every country. But when crazy stuff is being distributed worldwide, Latvia again and again manages to secure its claim for an extra portion...:
We went to see the Switzerland - Latvia football game in St. Gallen, with a whole crowd of Latvian and Swiss people who together went to the Latvian fan sector (you got to support the guest team, don't you).
And the Swiss managed to make a truly stupid mistake, which we found to be a massive affront (that is, we're not sure who is to blame: It might be the people responsible for the organization on the local stadium's side; might be the Swiss football federation; might even be the Latvian football federation, though that'd be ridiculous).
Short story: The audience was welcomed to the game in German and in French, and then the speaker announced that now, the Latvian fans will be welcomed. And what happened? Some lady read a welcome note in Russian...
I sincerely hope the Latvians will have the balls to play the German national anthem before the re-match in Riga next year.
And the Swiss managed to make a truly stupid mistake, which we found to be a massive affront (that is, we're not sure who is to blame: It might be the people responsible for the organization on the local stadium's side; might be the Swiss football federation; might even be the Latvian football federation, though that'd be ridiculous).
Short story: The audience was welcomed to the game in German and in French, and then the speaker announced that now, the Latvian fans will be welcomed. And what happened? Some lady read a welcome note in Russian...
I sincerely hope the Latvians will have the balls to play the German national anthem before the re-match in Riga next year.
Russia apparently doesn't approve of Mister Ahtisaari receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. Probably they'd find it more obvious to give it to Mr Putin and/or Mr Medvedev, whose heroic intervention in Southern Ossetia have started a long-lasting process of peace in the Caucasian region, a situation unknown to mankind before Russia came and showed us all the way.
At least you can't say they have no sense of irony. Slutsky, a representative of the foreign relations committee, was quoted basically like this: Giving the Prize to Ahtisaari is an attempt of "the west" (who?) to further legitimate the independence of Kosovo. Which, as Russia criticizes, has led to a whole row of new declarations of independence, including the recent ones in the Southern Caucasus.
At least you can't say they have no sense of irony. Slutsky, a representative of the foreign relations committee, was quoted basically like this: Giving the Prize to Ahtisaari is an attempt of "the west" (who?) to further legitimate the independence of Kosovo. Which, as Russia criticizes, has led to a whole row of new declarations of independence, including the recent ones in the Southern Caucasus.
Interesting to compare these Swiss migration-related numbers with each other:
- Percentage of foreigners among total population, 1910: 14.7% (just to mention it...!)
- Percentage of foreigners (permanent residents) among total population, 2007: ca. 21%
- Among those, 18.2% are Italians; 12.7% Germans; 11.7% from Serbia and Montenegro; 11.4% Portuguese; 4.9% French; 4.1% Spanish; and 18.9% from other European countries
- 86.5% of foreigners in Switzerland possess the citizenship of another European country; a bit more than half of them of a EU or EFTA country
- Foreigners perform a total of 27% of all work hours in Switzerland; this percentage is higher in leading positions
- Foreigners currently pay for about 19% of the total pension and social security system
- And they currently receive about 15% of the total pension and social security money
No comment needed, is there.
(Sources: Avenir Suisse; Swiss Social Insurances; and Federal Department of Statistics)
- Percentage of foreigners among total population, 1910: 14.7% (just to mention it...!)
- Percentage of foreigners (permanent residents) among total population, 2007: ca. 21%
- Among those, 18.2% are Italians; 12.7% Germans; 11.7% from Serbia and Montenegro; 11.4% Portuguese; 4.9% French; 4.1% Spanish; and 18.9% from other European countries
- 86.5% of foreigners in Switzerland possess the citizenship of another European country; a bit more than half of them of a EU or EFTA country
- Foreigners perform a total of 27% of all work hours in Switzerland; this percentage is higher in leading positions
- Foreigners currently pay for about 19% of the total pension and social security system
- And they currently receive about 15% of the total pension and social security money
No comment needed, is there.
(Sources: Avenir Suisse; Swiss Social Insurances; and Federal Department of Statistics)
By principle a supporter of Georgia, but trying to keep a balance nevertheless, I am both disappointed and worried about what Georgia actually did in these recent days. The action seemed random, and at some point outright aggressive, and it seemed to play right into Russia's hands, delivering good arguments for Russia to do what it had probably intended to do for a while already.
But things are never that simple. I've just been wondering what Georgia really tries to achieve:
I can't imagine Georgia had expected Russia to just stay calmly at the sidelines and watch what happens. No way. They knew Russia would seize the golden opportunity and take control of the breakaway territory (or territories). Also, it's been quite clear that Abkhazia would involve (or be involved by Russia).
I also can't imagine Georgia really expected armed support by their Western allies, since that game would've been far too risky for anyone involved. And yes, that was obvious from the start - and even more obvious when Russia hit back (and no, nobody could've expected Russia wouldn't).
It's hard to imagine Georgia expected to achieve a military victory in this that would've brought Southern Ossetia back (and maybe then Abkhazia as well in a second go).
And despite of inner political pressure on the Saakashvili government, the pressure doesn't appear big enough for the government to be pressed into actively escalating the conflict.
Since we can assume that no country would escalate such a conflict without a clear aim, I keep wondering what Georgia is really trying to achieve. It's clearly none of the above, so there must be a smarter strategic aim somewhere. What would that be?
Deliver the proof of Russia contradicting itself (Kosovo - Chechnya - Ossetia/Abkhazia)? Hardly, since proving something that everybody knows anyway is too small an achievement given the risks involved.
Get the Russian "peacekeeping" forces out of both Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, to see them replaced by (for example) a EU peace contingent?
That seems to be the most logical goal, and one that can be achieved without much bloodshed, if they play their diplomatic cards well (not too easy though - it's safe to assume that Russia's strategists aren't dumb either). If so, then this strategic goal must have been pre-agreed with the EU (or another body potentially to be involved), and both sides must have played the game together. I must admit this would be pretty clever, and currently it looks like they might indeed succeed.
Even though it remains a very risky game, since Russia as well as the two breakaway territories have a few good cards left - they might even manage to use the opportunity to destabilize or even remove Georgia's current government by simply blocking negotiations with the Saakashvili team, effectively moving the current Georgian government into a trap that's hard to escape (even though at the moment, it seems unlikely that a new government would change Georgia's political course).
However, this would be rather long-term thinking, since keeping Georgia's territory together (including Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, that is) seems like a very unrealistic goal to achieve in the near future by now. Negotiations will be started, only that I fail to see who would be the neutral party that could lead such negotiations, with the EU and the US having taken sides rather early (or, as I speculate above, maybe even having been part of the strategic planning of the events in the recent days).
What remains, too, at least for me at the moment, are mixed feelings about the way both sides treated the conflict, and about the massive propagandistic efforts.
It's nothing new and unexpected that most of the Russian media are biased; in fact, we so much expect them to be biased that we might not even notice if they (for once) weren't. From what I've seen in Moscow on Friday and in Russian online media in the following days, however, they were as biased as always.
What frustrated me as a supporter of Georgia, however, was that the Georgian side didn't play the game much cleaner than Russia this time. If Saakashvili for instance claims that Russia was planning to invade Georgia and gain control over the country, then this either means that his Soviet background has left him and his staff paranoid (an understandable emotion, but not one that can be allowed to drive political decisions); or it means that he uses this rhetoric to frighten and thus unify the population. Since, seriously: Russia most certainly didn't have the intention to invade and take over Georgia, that'd be absurdly risky and, yes, totally stupid. Rationally thinking as they or at least their strategic staff must be, nobody in the Saakashvili government can have seriously expected Russia to invade and occupy Georgia at this time, in this geopolitical situation. It's understandable if the population believes in the risk of a Russian occupation (or, worse, is talked into believing in such risk...), but the political leadership must have a bit of a clearer vision than that.
What frustrated me in addition is that the Estonian press, which I followed a little as I just happen to be in Tallinn, looked surprisingly biased this time, too. Even though normally, I experience the Estonian press as reasonably balanced, even when it's about issues that have a high emotional impact here; this time, I remember a number of articles that were following Georgia's rhetoric a little bit too blindly. And despite of me being indeed critical of Russia, and obviously supporting Georgia by principle, this must not mean to just remain blind. As much as Georgia is no angel, Russia is no devil. Local emotions of course might occasionally be different, given the experience of occupation and the constant perceived threat of the big Russia right behind the border - but emotions make not only a bad driver for politics, they also make poor journalism.
And above all: In the current moment, Europe has one tremendously valuable asset, and that is its humanistic and moral argumentation that's based on strong democratic institutions and a strong discussion culture. Europe's credibility (and more!) bases strongly on this one asset. And every step of any country that considers itself a part of this wider European something has a direct influence on this credibility. When European countries (including Estonia and Georgia) at times use measures or rhetorics or techniques or propagandistic approaches like Russia does at all times, this is not helpful for Europe's credibility, and therefore for Europe's political influence. In fact, it delivers very welcome arguments to Eurosceptics both inside and outside the EU, and to countries with whom Europe is in fact in a political struggle for power, among them, obviously, Russia itself. The moral credibility is an asset that Europe has to hold dear, even if that means to sometimes remain silent towards silly propagandistic accusations or threats by countries like the big neighbor in the East. This may be difficult, but in the long-term, it's where one of Europe's real strengths lies, and it's one of the few chances Europe still has to play an influential role in global politics in the 21st century.
And at least people like me most certainly wish Europe to play such influential role. When looking at the alternatives, the world really does need a European-style political influence.
(updated on 13.8.)
15.8.: After the events of the past 2 or 3 days, this one would deserve a number of updates. About Russia's dubious actions; about new possible outcomes; about Georgia most probably indeed being forced into a situation that doesn't allow any other options (if the government is to keep earlier promises...); about the Estonian press that published a few very interesting articles in the meantime. However, I lack the time for such updates now.
But things are never that simple. I've just been wondering what Georgia really tries to achieve:
I can't imagine Georgia had expected Russia to just stay calmly at the sidelines and watch what happens. No way. They knew Russia would seize the golden opportunity and take control of the breakaway territory (or territories). Also, it's been quite clear that Abkhazia would involve (or be involved by Russia).
I also can't imagine Georgia really expected armed support by their Western allies, since that game would've been far too risky for anyone involved. And yes, that was obvious from the start - and even more obvious when Russia hit back (and no, nobody could've expected Russia wouldn't).
It's hard to imagine Georgia expected to achieve a military victory in this that would've brought Southern Ossetia back (and maybe then Abkhazia as well in a second go).
And despite of inner political pressure on the Saakashvili government, the pressure doesn't appear big enough for the government to be pressed into actively escalating the conflict.
Since we can assume that no country would escalate such a conflict without a clear aim, I keep wondering what Georgia is really trying to achieve. It's clearly none of the above, so there must be a smarter strategic aim somewhere. What would that be?
Deliver the proof of Russia contradicting itself (Kosovo - Chechnya - Ossetia/Abkhazia)? Hardly, since proving something that everybody knows anyway is too small an achievement given the risks involved.
Get the Russian "peacekeeping" forces out of both Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, to see them replaced by (for example) a EU peace contingent?
That seems to be the most logical goal, and one that can be achieved without much bloodshed, if they play their diplomatic cards well (not too easy though - it's safe to assume that Russia's strategists aren't dumb either). If so, then this strategic goal must have been pre-agreed with the EU (or another body potentially to be involved), and both sides must have played the game together. I must admit this would be pretty clever, and currently it looks like they might indeed succeed.
Even though it remains a very risky game, since Russia as well as the two breakaway territories have a few good cards left - they might even manage to use the opportunity to destabilize or even remove Georgia's current government by simply blocking negotiations with the Saakashvili team, effectively moving the current Georgian government into a trap that's hard to escape (even though at the moment, it seems unlikely that a new government would change Georgia's political course).
However, this would be rather long-term thinking, since keeping Georgia's territory together (including Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, that is) seems like a very unrealistic goal to achieve in the near future by now. Negotiations will be started, only that I fail to see who would be the neutral party that could lead such negotiations, with the EU and the US having taken sides rather early (or, as I speculate above, maybe even having been part of the strategic planning of the events in the recent days).
What remains, too, at least for me at the moment, are mixed feelings about the way both sides treated the conflict, and about the massive propagandistic efforts.
It's nothing new and unexpected that most of the Russian media are biased; in fact, we so much expect them to be biased that we might not even notice if they (for once) weren't. From what I've seen in Moscow on Friday and in Russian online media in the following days, however, they were as biased as always.
What frustrated me as a supporter of Georgia, however, was that the Georgian side didn't play the game much cleaner than Russia this time. If Saakashvili for instance claims that Russia was planning to invade Georgia and gain control over the country, then this either means that his Soviet background has left him and his staff paranoid (an understandable emotion, but not one that can be allowed to drive political decisions); or it means that he uses this rhetoric to frighten and thus unify the population. Since, seriously: Russia most certainly didn't have the intention to invade and take over Georgia, that'd be absurdly risky and, yes, totally stupid. Rationally thinking as they or at least their strategic staff must be, nobody in the Saakashvili government can have seriously expected Russia to invade and occupy Georgia at this time, in this geopolitical situation. It's understandable if the population believes in the risk of a Russian occupation (or, worse, is talked into believing in such risk...), but the political leadership must have a bit of a clearer vision than that.
What frustrated me in addition is that the Estonian press, which I followed a little as I just happen to be in Tallinn, looked surprisingly biased this time, too. Even though normally, I experience the Estonian press as reasonably balanced, even when it's about issues that have a high emotional impact here; this time, I remember a number of articles that were following Georgia's rhetoric a little bit too blindly. And despite of me being indeed critical of Russia, and obviously supporting Georgia by principle, this must not mean to just remain blind. As much as Georgia is no angel, Russia is no devil. Local emotions of course might occasionally be different, given the experience of occupation and the constant perceived threat of the big Russia right behind the border - but emotions make not only a bad driver for politics, they also make poor journalism.
And above all: In the current moment, Europe has one tremendously valuable asset, and that is its humanistic and moral argumentation that's based on strong democratic institutions and a strong discussion culture. Europe's credibility (and more!) bases strongly on this one asset. And every step of any country that considers itself a part of this wider European something has a direct influence on this credibility. When European countries (including Estonia and Georgia) at times use measures or rhetorics or techniques or propagandistic approaches like Russia does at all times, this is not helpful for Europe's credibility, and therefore for Europe's political influence. In fact, it delivers very welcome arguments to Eurosceptics both inside and outside the EU, and to countries with whom Europe is in fact in a political struggle for power, among them, obviously, Russia itself. The moral credibility is an asset that Europe has to hold dear, even if that means to sometimes remain silent towards silly propagandistic accusations or threats by countries like the big neighbor in the East. This may be difficult, but in the long-term, it's where one of Europe's real strengths lies, and it's one of the few chances Europe still has to play an influential role in global politics in the 21st century.
And at least people like me most certainly wish Europe to play such influential role. When looking at the alternatives, the world really does need a European-style political influence.
(updated on 13.8.)
15.8.: After the events of the past 2 or 3 days, this one would deserve a number of updates. About Russia's dubious actions; about new possible outcomes; about Georgia most probably indeed being forced into a situation that doesn't allow any other options (if the government is to keep earlier promises...); about the Estonian press that published a few very interesting articles in the meantime. However, I lack the time for such updates now.
Mister Medvedev brings us two messages, maybe they're from yesterday, but for me they're breakfast news:
1: Neither the NATO nor the OSCE are "capable of solving all security issues in Europe".
Well: Show me who would be.
2: According to Dima, it's necessary to limit the influence of "international organizations that base on ideological principles".
Probably he just prefers national organizations that base on ideological principles.
Since he'll have a hard time finding organizations that do not base on some kind of "ideological principles" - NGO's? The UN? Unicef? The Oxford Stamp Collector's Union? I smell ideologies there.
1: Neither the NATO nor the OSCE are "capable of solving all security issues in Europe".
Well: Show me who would be.
2: According to Dima, it's necessary to limit the influence of "international organizations that base on ideological principles".
Probably he just prefers national organizations that base on ideological principles.
Since he'll have a hard time finding organizations that do not base on some kind of "ideological principles" - NGO's? The UN? Unicef? The Oxford Stamp Collector's Union? I smell ideologies there.
Referendum for tougher citizenship rules (by allowing communities to vote about granting citizenship to its residents, with no right to appeal): 64% "no" votes.
People's initiative that would ban the government from publicly arguing for its political position ahead of popular votes: 75% "no" votes.
And there's a realistic risk that the SVP ("Swiss People's Party", a nice name for an increasingly dirty right-wing populist party) will split up, with its liberal wings separating from the main party. If this happens should be known Monday during the day, but it smells like the liberal party section from the Canton of Bern might leave the SVP in a reaction to the SVP expelling another liberal party section yesterday (the liberal Graubünden cantonal section). It's all a bit more complicated than this, but that's the short version.
A bad day for our right-wing populist freak party.
A good day for citizens like me (and yes, of course I did vote).
People's initiative that would ban the government from publicly arguing for its political position ahead of popular votes: 75% "no" votes.
And there's a realistic risk that the SVP ("Swiss People's Party", a nice name for an increasingly dirty right-wing populist party) will split up, with its liberal wings separating from the main party. If this happens should be known Monday during the day, but it smells like the liberal party section from the Canton of Bern might leave the SVP in a reaction to the SVP expelling another liberal party section yesterday (the liberal Graubünden cantonal section). It's all a bit more complicated than this, but that's the short version.
A bad day for our right-wing populist freak party.
A good day for citizens like me (and yes, of course I did vote).
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